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• ‘National’ evaluation of five IOM pioneer sites – process 
evaluation, break even analysis and impact feasibility study -
MoJ
• ‘National’ evaluation of five Intensive Alternatives to Custody 
(IAC) pilot projects – process evaluation, break even analysis 
and impact feasibility study  - MoJ
• Review of the piloting of Layered Offender Management in 
prisons in Yorkshire Humberside and tiering in 2 prisons in 
England  - MoJ
• Evaluation of IOM and VCS capacity building project – Home 
Office
• Development work on Payment by results (PBR) 
Theory of change approach to policy and 
programme evaluation
• Should it work?  - does it make sense
• Can it work? – sufficient resources, 
capable staff
• Does it work? – what is the impact and 
scale of impact?
• Is it worth it? – does the benefit justify the 
cost of investment?
Dhiri and Brand 1999

Radical and realistic reform
“Despite record spending we are not delivering what really matters. 
Society has a right to expect the criminal justice system will protect 
them. Prison will always be the place for serious and dangerous 
offenders. 
Prisons should also be places of hard work and industry and 
community sentences must be credible and robust. Criminals 
must also be reformed so that when they finish their sentences 
they do not simply return to crime, creating more misery for victims. 
We cannot let this continue. Solving these problems requires a 
radically different approach.
“Reducing re-offending without reducing punishment”
Criminal Justice Green Paper - Highlights?
• Criminal Justice Green Paper published in December 2010
o Run rehabilitation pilots with sufficient scale to provide 
statistically significant results
o Market testing of justice services delivered by public sector 
providers with VCS and private sector providers
o Payment by results
o Cost effectiveness
o Justice re-investment
o Extending restorative justice
o Changes to sentencing
Current policy and fiscal context?
• Comprehensive spending review on 20th October announced 24% reduction in spending for 
the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) 
o Reductions in prison building, prison places
• Reductions in spending in other related areas of public service delivery which impact on re-
offending: supported housing, 
• Criminal Justice Green Paper and Criminal Justice Policy (per se) is not stand alone – it will be 
impacted by: Cross Government Drugs Strategy,  Review of Offender Learning and others…
• Responsibility for reducing re-offending is contested between MoJ and Home Office
o Integrated Offender Management – differences in emphasis between MoJ and HO; IOM 
and VCS (Big Society)
o Reducing re-offending – a statutory responsibility for Community Safety Partnerships
• MoJ consultation on  changing the way that re-offending and other justice related statistics 
are defined, measured  and presented
Radically different?
Green paper What’s gone before?
Punishing offenders
more effectively in the 
community
•Merrington and Stanley (2005) review of intensive supervision 
schemes from late 1980’s and 1990s 
•Intensive support and supervison (ISSP) in youth justice
•MoJ Penal Policy Paper 2007 trailed 
•IAC Intensive Alternatives to Custody (IAC) from 2008
Integrated offender
management (IOM)
•Development of multi-agency arrangements from PPOs, MAPPA
•Six IOM Pioneer Sites from  2008 (and before) to a proliferation 
of IOM across England and Wales – bottom up development
Market testing of 
justice services
•Contestability from 2005
•NOMS VCS Change up pilots: Nacro MOVE, Clinks led project 
and others from 2005
Restorative justice 
(RJ)
•Not radical enough?
•RJ for PPOs delivered post sentence and in prison
Payment by results •Existed in NHS – to drive more effective clinical practice
•Not previously existed for Justice Services
Should it work?
Implementing the Green Paper will 
deliver more effective justice 
services at reduced cost  
Economic questions we should be asking
• What is the true cost of an intervention?
• Do the outcome(s) achieved justify the investment of 
resources?
• Is this the most efficient way of realising the desired 
outcome(s) or could the same outcome(s) have been 
achieved at a lower cost through an alternate course of 
action?
• How should resources be spent?
Dhiri and Brand 1999
How do we answer these questions
• Cost analysis: Deals only with the costs of an intervention – costing 
of LOM and Tiering in custody
• Cost effectiveness analysis: Consequences of an intervention are 
measured in the most appropriate effects or physical units such as 
burglaries avoided or drug free years resulting e.g. £1,000 per 
burglary avoided – SWAG Evaluation
• Cost benefit analysis: A form of evaluation where the 
consequences are valued in monetary terms – break even analysis 
of IAC, IOM
• Economic modelling: Might fulfil different purposes e.g. where key 
estimates are not available or where a longer-run assessment of 
impact is required.
Drummond et al 2005
Case study 1:  Cost Analysis 
Review of Layered Offender Management 
and tiering in prison
Review of piloting of Layered offender 
management (LOM) and tiering in custody
Aims
• To assess the potential for roll out of LOM
o Offender management for all prisoners based on sentence 
length and risk
o Delivering more efficient and streamlined processes
• To test the potential for tiering in custody based on the 
principles (operated through tiering in the community) of:
o “Resources follow risk”
o “Least necessary”
LOM Model
• Case management by a dedicated offender 
supervisor (OS) and case administrator (CA)
• Basic custody screening tool (based on OASys) 
for remands and under 12 month prisoners (a 
standard tool for all prisons)
• A single case file
• Co-location of OS and CA
LOM and tiering
Layers – based on sentence length 
and risk
Tiers – based on risk of re-
offending and risk of harm
Layer 1 – non-statutory offenders 
(under 12 month sentence) and 
remands
Layer 2 – young prisoners and adult 
offenders serving sentences of 12 
months or more (not in Phases 2 and 
3  of OM)
Layer 3 - prisoners in scope of OM 
phases 2 & 3 (lifers, PPOs, IPPs)  
Tiers 1 – 4  based on an actuarial 
assessment of risk of re-offending and 
risk of harm – using a revised 
calculator tool based on the tiering tool 
used by probation in the community
Does it work?
• LOM and Tiering provides a defensible and logical way 
of allocating OM resources more effectively
• Implementation required additional resources although it 
had the potential to be cost neutral 
• Training needs from LOM had been underestimated
• LOM has the potential to deliver more efficient and 
streamlined services
• Requires leadership and commitment to change at all 
levels of management and from OM staff
Impact of tiering
% Prisoners up-tiered
(principally from Layer
1 to Tier 3 or Tier 4)
% Prisoners down-
tiered 
(principally from Layer 
2 and 3 to Tier 1 or 2)
Prison One
(total of 209 prisoners)
31.6% 37.3%
Prison Two
(total of 754 prisoners)
5.4% 51.5%
Cost impact of tiering
(based on modelling)
Moving to a risk based tiering approach from a 
sentence length approach (which layering 
represents) demonstrated potential modest 
cost savings at a local prison and potential 
significant cost savings at a training prison 
for the total cost of assessment over the 
sentence length of prisoners
NB Impact on re-offending or other measures were 
not tested
Implications from the review
• Using whole population data about needs (through LOM or OM for 
all) has the potential to reduce over-commissioning and reduce 
costs – buying what you need
• Tiering can provide a ‘triaging’ function for the allocation of OM 
resources based on risk of re-offending and risk of harm – which 
allows for the level of OM intervention to be scaled up or down 
according to resources available
• However, it relies on a case management process provided by LOM 
to assess need and manage sentence plans in custody and through 
the prison gate
• There is a need to manage up-tiered non statutory offenders in the 
community – through IOM?  What type of IOM?  Resources for this?
• If Tiering in custody is to proceed, there needs to be a single tiering
tool for community and custody
Case study 2:  Cost Benefit Analysis
Intensive Alternatives to Custody 
Intensive alternatives to custody 
• Aiming to divert offenders at risk of a 
short term custodial sentence
• A community order which typically 
includes:
o Intensive supervision by probation – twice weekly 
o Punishment – electronic curfew and/or intensive unpaid 
work
o Mentoring
o Court reviews
o Accredited programmes where required
Does it work?
• Many persistent offenders (on average 29 prior 
convictions) were positive about the order
• Sentencers welcomed the order as a viable 
alternative to custody
• Probation and partners positive about the 
efficacy of IAC
• Impact needs to be tested by re-conviction study
Is IAC cost effective? 
Short term sentence
• Cost of prison
• Cost of probation
• Cost of future 
offences
IAC
• Cost of an IAC order 
(based on the pilots)
• Expected cost to 
society of an offender 
committing offences 
while on IAC 
(estimated from the 
pilots)
Costs of a custodial sentence
Cost of custody Cost of probation
Cost of future career
Representation of future 
offending career
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3
Convicted of re-offence:
Cost of offence + cost of detection + cost of trial + 
cost of sentence + cost of probation + cost of future career
IAC costs and assumptions 
• Average project costs of an IAC sentence per offender 
per year is £5,251
• Costs of short term custody are £48,083
• The probability of revokation and re-sentencing on IAC
• 59.9% of offenders released from short term custody re-
offend in the first year (NB if someone is in prison, they 
are not offending)
Findings from Break Even Analysis
• In order to break even compared to a 
period of 45 days incarceration (average 
length of sentence served for short term custody), a 
typical IAC programme must reduce the 
re-offending by a modest level
Implications of IAC evaluation
• How to mainstream IAC - given reductions in public finance, ‘age of 
austerity’ while retaining elements that are effective – can the 
Government afford more expensive community orders?
• Impact needs to be test quantitatively through a re-conviction 
analysis
• Targeting and selection of offenders for IAC is critical – best bang 
for your buck
• IAC needs to be promoted to sentencers and court staff as a distinct 
order/package
• Mentoring can make an important contribution to compliance and 
support but requires adequate resources to facilitate this 
• Potential to transfer practice in managing prolific (non statutory) 
offenders between IOM and IAC 
Case study 3 – Economic modelling
A NICE model of criminal justice investment 
from Washington State
Justice Re-investment 
Seeking to reduce crime in the most 
efficient way possible by creating a law 
abiding society at lower cost than current 
approaches provide
Example of long-run economic 
model
• The work of Steve Aos and colleagues at 
the Washington State Institute for Public 
Policy
• Already being quoted as potential model for 
the UK by:
• The Justice Select Committee (House of Commons)
• The Conservative Party
• The Mayor of London.
• Work currently underway in Greater 
Manchester to first replicate and then build 
on this model
Three-stage research project
1. Review the empirical evidence to identify 
whether there are any evidence-based public 
criminal justice and prevention policies and 
programs that have a proven ability to affect 
crime rates. 
2. Determine whether each option has favorable 
economics ie do long-term benefits outweigh 
costs for each option.
3. Project how state-wide implementation of 
alternative portfolios of evidence-based 
options would influence the long-run need for 
prison beds, state and local fiscal costs, and 
crime rates.
Stage 1: What works
Aos 2006: Exhibit 4
Stage 2: Costs and benefits
Aos 2006: Exhibit 4
Stage 3: Long-run models of 
different portfolios
Current level portfolio
• Assumes that existing evidence-based programs in 
Washington State continue to be funded at current levels in 
the years ahead. 
Moderate level portfolio
• Assumes that existing evidence-based programs are 
expanded to reach 20% more of remaining eligible people. 
Aggressive portfolio
• Assumes that the current levels of existing programs are 
expanded to serve 40% of remaining people who are eligible
Stage 3: Forecasts
Aos et al 2006: Exhibit 5
Cost savings
• From the perspective of state and local taxpayers 
Aos et al (2006) find that, between 2008 and 2030, 
taxpayers could save from $1.9 to $2.6 billion with 
the moderate to aggressive portfolios, respectively
• Expressed as a ratio, the portfolios generate from 
$2.59 to $2.75 of taxpayer benefits per dollar of 
cost.
• Saving start to accrue relatively quickly
Return on investment
Aos et al 2006: Exhibit 7
Case study 4:  Payment by results?
Payment by results
• Size and type of cohort - Large enough number to generate a statistically 
significant change (not due to chance or other factors)  Mix of offenders 
(requiring differing levels of intervention) in order to manage business risk
• Measurement - specifying outcomes
o Prevalence - proportion of offenders who re-offend over a specified time
o Frequency – regularity with which an offender re-offends
o Time to re-offend 
o Seriousness
o Court reviews
• Payment mechanism - payment for delivery and payment for outcome
• Attribution of results - who gets the bonus?
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